The opinions of Madison documented below are in the context of whether only land owners would be allowed to vote in elections for one or both branches of the legislature, or whether other free persons (meaning men of course) would be allowed suffrage. There was a lot of concern for the time when land in America would no longer be free, and when the land owners (mostly by inheritance) would become the minority of the citizenry as it is today. Of interest here is much of the text of the second note which addresses the effects of constituency size on the likely outcome of elections. These notes, especially the earlier one of August 1787, reflect the compromise (unwanted by Madison) in which the State legislators were to select the members of the Senate.

These comments are taken from: The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional
Convention Debates -- authored by Ralph Ketcham

Page 150 -

When arranging his notes for the debates of the Constitution of 1787 in old age, Madison observed that his Comments on suffrage did not convey his "full and matured view of the subject". He thus appended two notes, a short one probably written on August 7, 1787, and a larger one probably written in the 1820's.

First Note -- August 7, 1787

As appointments for the General Government here contemplated will, in part, be made by the State Governments, all the Citizens in States where the right of suffrage is not limited to the holders of property, will have an indirect share of representation in the General Government. But this does not satisfy the fundamental principle that men can not be justly bound by laws in the making which they have no part. Persons and property being both essential objects of Government, the most that either can claim, is such a structure of it, as will leave a reasonable security for the other. And the most obvious provision, of this double character seems to be least secure in popular Government, the right of suffrage for one of the two branches. This is not without example among us, as well as other constitutional modifications, favoring the influence of property in the Government. But the U.S. have not reached the the Stage of Society in which conflicting feelings of the class with, and the class without property, have the operational natural to them in countries fully peopled. The most difficult of all political arrangements is that of so adjusting the claims of the two class as to give security to each, and to promote the welfare of all. The federal principle -- which enlarges the sphere of power without departing from the elective bases of and controls in various ways the propensity in small republics to rash measures and the facility of forming and executing them, will be found the best expedient yet tried for solving the problem.

1821-1829 Page 155

Should Experience or public opinion require an equal and universal suffrage for each branch of the Government such as prevails generally in the U.S., (then) a resource favorable to the rights of landed and other property, when its possessors become the Minority, may be found in the enlargement of the Election Districts for ONE branch of the Legislature and a prolongation of its period of service. Large districts are manifestly favorable to the election of persons of general respectability, and of probable attachment to the rights of property, over competitors depending on the personal solicitations practicable on a contracted theater. And although an ambitious candidate, of personal distinction, might occasionally recommend himself to popular choice by espousing a popular though unjust object, it might rarely happen to many districts at the same time. The tendency of a longer period of service would be, to render the Body more stable in its policy, and more capable of stemming popular currents taking a wrong direction, till reason and justice could regain their ascendancy.

Should even such a modification as the last be deemed inadmissible, and universal suffrage and very short periods of elections within contracted spheres be required for each branch of the Government, the security for the holders of property when the minority, can only be derived from the ordinary influence possessed by property, and the superior information incident to its holders; from the popular sense of justice enlarged and by a diffusive education; and from the difficulty of combining and effectuating unjust purposes throughout an extensive country; a difficulty essentially distinguishing the U.S. and even most of the individual States, from the small communities where a mistaken interest or contagious passion, could readily unite a majority of the whole under a factious leader in trampling on the rights of the Minor party.